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Abstract
Both classical and quantum mechanics assume that physical laws are invariant un-
der changes in the way that the world is labeled. This Principle of Decompositional
Equivalence is formalized, and shown to forbid finite experimental demonstrations
that given pointer states |p1 > and |p2 > refer to the same physical system S. It
is then shown that any extra-theoretical assumption that given pointer states |p1 >
and |p2 > with indistinguishable coefficients in a Schmidt basis for the universe refer
to the same physical system S is stronger than the assumption of classicality. Stan-
dard interpretations of quantum mechanics make such as assumption in analyzing
measurement; hence they are logically inconsistent.
Keywords Foundations of quantum mechanics, measurement problem, existential inter-
pretation, quantum Darwinism
1 Introduction
Both classical and quantum mechanics assume that physical laws are invariant under
changes in the way that the world is labeled. Let us call this assumption the “Princi-
ple of Decompositional Equivalence (PDE).” It can be formalized as follows. Consider
a universe U , and let S0 ⊂ U be a system comprising a number of quantum degrees of
freedom that is larger than one, but negligibly small compared to the degrees of freedom
of its environment E0 = U \ S0 (here and below, “X = Z \ Y ” is used as a shorthand
indicating Z = X ⊗ Y ). Consider a family F0 of distinct systems such that each Sk ∈ F0
can be written Sk = S0 ⊗ ψk, where ψk represents a single degree of freedom not part of
S0. Corresponding to each Sk is an environment Ek = U \ Sk. In this notation, the PDE
is:
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Principle of Decompositional Equivalence: For any system S0 ⊂ U and any
family of systems F0 as defined as above, if HS0−E0 6= 0 is a well-defined
Hamiltonian specifying an interaction between S0 and E0, there are well-defined
Hamiltonians HSk−Ek 6= 0 specifying interactions between S
k and Ek for every
Sk ∈ F0 .
Fully unitary quantum mechanics clearly requires a universe compliant with the PDE.
Without it, neither the Hamiltonian HU of the universe U as a whole, nor any observables
expressible in terms of HU are well-defined.
The PDE states that decompositional boundaries are not respected by physical dynamics,
i.e. that they are arbitrary. It therefore conflicts prima facie with the intuitive, classical
notion that the physical world includes discrete “objects” with real, “natural” boundaries.
It also conflicts prima facie with the quantum mechanical notion that decoherence acting
at the “natural” boundaries of macroscopic objects einselects pointer states that then de-
fine those “natural” boundaries for observers, as has been proposed under the rubrics of
the existential interpretation and quantum Darwinism [1, 2, 3, 4]. This paper shows that
this prima facie conflict is serious. It demonstrates two limitations imposed on observers
by the PDE: first, that no observer can conclusively identify the system S represented by
a given pointer state |p >, even if the non-zero components of |p > are expressed in a
Schmidt basis for U ; and second, that no two observers at one time, or one observer at
two times, can conclusively establish that two pointer states |p1 > and |p2 > represent the
same system S, even if their non-zero components in a Schmidt basis for U are identical.
Hence any interactions between observers and macroscopic “objects” that involve either
re-identification of objects by observers over time, or agreement among observers that they
are interacting with the same object, require an extra-theoretical assumption that complete
specifications of pointer states are “given” by decoherence, or by any other process that
acts effectively as an oracle. This extra-theoretical assumption of oracular completeness is
characterized, and shown to be stronger than the assumption of classicality. All interpre-
tations of quantum mechanics in which the pointer states of macroscopic objects such as
apparatus are treated as “given” by an oracular process, and in which the measurement
problem thereby arises in its traditional form, assume oracular completeness, and are there-
fore logically inconsistent. Dropping the assumption of oracular completeness effectively
converts the measurement problem into a conceptually more straightforward problem of
understanding how information is encoded by the states of observers.
2 Decoherence as oracle: “frog perspective”
The notion of measurement, indeed the notion of an independently-existing external world,
requires that not all facts are stipulated; some facts must be “given” by observation. Such
“given” facts are, in effect, provided by an oracle. In the context of minimal quantum
mechanics, decoherence [1, 2, 4] is the oracle. We first consider the functioning of the oracle
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of decoherence from the point of view of a fixed observer O, what Tegmark [5] calls the
“frog perspective.” Suppose O makes a sequence of N observations, each of finite duration
∆t. The information contributing to an observation initiated at time ti has a maximum
transmission channel pathlength of c∆t, where c is the speed of light. All such information,
regardless of its ultimate origin, must therefore be encoded by degrees of freedom within
a sphere of radius c∆t surrounding the fixed position of O at ti if it is to contribute to
the observation initiated at ti. Call the collection of degrees of freedom that contribute
information to O’s observation at ti Z
O|ti, the “horizon” of O at ti. For any ∆t small
compared to the age of the universe but larger than about 1 ps, ZO|ti is macroscopic, but
still small compared to its environment U \ZO|ti. Hence provided that Z
O|ti is not isolated,
the interaction between ZO|ti and U \ Z
O|ti will einselect a pointer state of Z
O|ti within a
decoherence interval of at most the photon-transit time ∆t. Call this pointer state |pi >.
The observations “given” to any O by the oracle of decoherence constitute a sequence of
such pointer states |pi >.
We now ask, what can O infer from these “given” observations |p1 > ...|pN >, and in
particular, what can O infer about the “object” ZO that those observations describe, an
object that properly includes O herself? We assume fully unitary quantum mechanics, and
hence the PDE. Employing the notation used to formalize the PDE, two lemmas follow
immediately from this assumption:
Lemma 1 : Within any subset U ′ ⊆ U with finite degrees of freedom, if at least one macro-
scopic system is not isolated, no macroscopic systems are isolated. Proof : Let S0 name the
non-isolated system. Then by the PDE, each element of F0 is non-isolated. This labeling
process can be iterated to incorporate every degree of freedom of U ′ into the family Fm
associated with some non-isolated Sm. 
Lemma 2 : If HS0−E0 decoheres S
0 and einselects pointer states {|p0i >}, then for every
Sk ∈ F0 , HSk−Ek decoheres S
k and einselects pointer states {|pki >}. Proof : Let |S
0 >
be an arbitrary state of S0, and |ψk > be an arbitrary state of a degree of freedom ψk not
contained within S0. Because < S0|ψk >= 0, HSk−Ek can be defined such that |S
0 ><
S0|HSk−Ek = HS0−E0 , in which case the required pointer states are |p
k
i >= (1−|ψ
k|)2|p0i >
+HSk−Ek |ψ
k >. Decoherence of Sk and hence einselection of some |pki > depends only on E
k
being sufficiently large and HSk−Ek being non-zero. E
0 is sufficiently large by assumption,
and Ek is only one degree of freedom smaller. If HS0−E0 is non-zero, HSk−Ek is non-zero
by Lemma 1. 
Lemma 1 shows that if any ZO|ti, is isolated, all are isolated, and in fact all are isolated
for all observers. Hence the only non-trivial case is the one in which no ZO|ti for any
observer is isolated. In this case, all observers O are provided by the oracle of decoherence
with pointer states |pOi > for every ∆t-long interval of observation. Because the |p
O
i > are
states of non-isolated systems, the no-cloning theorem [6] does not forbid their cloning and
hence re-identification by observers. The “given” |pOi > are not, however, einselected at a
stipulated S − O boundary by a characterized S − O interaction; they are einselected at
the boundary between Z0|ti and U \ Z
0|ti , a boundary to which O has, by definition, no
independent observational access. Hence any observer O presented with a |pj > identical to
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a previously-observed |pi > is faced with the question of whether |pj > and |pi > refer to the
same system, i.e. the question of whether Z0|ti = Z
0|tj . This question is not trivial. Any
observer walking into a laboratory, for example, will want to know whether pointer positions
on meters and numbers displayed on digital readouts represent experimental results or
calibration tests [7]. Whether this question can be answered definitively depends on what
kind of oracle decoherence is.
Assume that HU is known completely, and consider two distinct types of oracle. A “com-
plete” oracle, when queried at time ti by an observer O, provides the complete specification
of a pointer state |pi > in a basis for Z
O|ti that is a projection into Z
O|ti of a Schmidt
basis for U , including all components with coefficients of zero. In contrast, a “projecting”
oracle, when queried at time ti, provides only the non-zero Schmidt-basis components of
the same pointer state. An observer O who knowingly queries a complete oracle at suc-
cessive times t1...tN and receives pointer-state specifications |p
C
1
> ...|PCN > can infer, from
the set of basis vectors appearing in the specification of each |pCi >, what system S
i each
|pCi > represents, and can unambiguously identify pairs of pointer states that represent
the same system. However, if O knowingly queries a projecting oracle at successive times
t1...tN and receives pointer-state specifications |p
P
1
> ...|P PN >, O cannot infer the existence
of any system unambiguously, and cannot identify pairs of (projected) pointer states that
represent the same system, even if their components are identical.
Theorem 1 : No oracle R can be demonstrated to be complete by a finite number of exper-
iments. Proof : Let |p1 > ...|pN > be the pointer states “given” by R to O in response to a
finite number of queries. (1) Because R must answer each query in finite time ∆t, R can
only specify each |pi > using a finite number of basis vectors with coefficients given to some
finite accuracy δ. Hence O cannot prove that the set of components comprising a “given”
pointer state |pi > is complete by a normalization test. (2) Since each |pi > has a finite
specification, O can compute the projection |p1 >< p1|pi > for each given |pi >. If for any
query i, |p1 >< p1|pi > 6= |pi >, R is a projecting oracle. Hence the only case of interest is
that in which |p1 >< p1|pi >= |pi > for all i, that is, the case in which the basis of, and
hence the boundary of Z0 appears static. (3) The PDE requires that for any system S0, a
family F0 of systems Sk differing from S0 by only one degree of freedom ψk can be defined;
Lemma 2 requires that any such system Sk is represented by pointer states. Demonstrat-
ing that R is complete for an apparently static horizon Z0 by direct empirical observation
therefore requires demonstrating that any degree of freedom ψk not represented by a basis
vector in |p1 > is outside of Z
0, i.e. that the minimum information transfer pathlength
from ψk to O is greater than c∆t. O cannot do this, however, as O has no independent
observational access to the boundary of Z0|ti for any ti. (4) Direct observation of the phys-
ical process by which R generates the |pi > thus being impossible, R can only be treated
as an algorithm to be reverse engineered. If R can be shown to implement no algorithmic
step in which a component αijuij of a pointer state |pi > is tested to determine whether
|αij| ≤ δ, R can be shown to be complete. However, any R capable of implementing such
a step has at least the computational complexity of a classical finite state machine. Any
reverse-engineering demonstration of R’s algorithm is, therefore, forbidden by Theorem 2
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of Moore [8], which states that no finite set of observations can unambiguously determine
the algorithm executed by a finite state machine. 
Theorem 1 applies without modification not only to the full pointer state |pi > of an ob-
server’s horizon ZO|ti at ti, but to any projection |S >< S|pi > that implicitly defines
a system S ⊂ ZO|ti that an observer might stipulate to be “of interest” at ti. Theo-
rem 1 therefore shows that the situation envisaged by quantum Darwinism, in which a
collection of independent observers interact with “given” substates of their own individ-
ual, disjoint horizons in order to mutually and non-perturbatively establish the state of
an external system of interest [2, 3], cannot be realized without an extra-theoretical and
non-empirical assumption that the oracle of decoherence is complete. The same restriction
applies to a single observer who compares a currently-observed pointer state to a memory
record of a previously-observed pointer state in order to establish the continuing existence
of an identified S, as envisged by the existential interpretation [1, 2, 4]; any such com-
parison of “given” pointer states across measurement times requires an extra-theoretical,
non-empirical assumption of oracular completeness. Nothing in the proof of Theorem 1,
moreover, relies on unitary evolution of U as a whole, or on the specific mechanism of
decoherence; hence Theorem 1 applies to any postulated oracular mechanism that delivers
pointer-state specifications in a fixed basis and in a fixed amount of time, provided only
that such a mechanism can be represented as an observable in a universe compliant with
the PDE.
3 Decoherence as oracle: “bird perspective”
The restrictions on observation implied by Theorem 1 can also be reached from Tegmark’s
meta-theoretical “bird perspective” by noting that a simple notational change:
Ψ =
∑
λk|sk > −→ Ψ =
∑
λk|S
k > (1)
converts a wave function specifed as a superposition of basis vectors spanning a stipulated
system S into a wave function specified as a superposition of individual states |Sk > of
a collection {Sk ⊂ S} of stipulated subsystems such that ∀k, dim(Sk) = dim(S) − 1 and
∪{Sk} = S. Let O be an observable defined everywhere in a U ⊃ S compliant with
decompositional equivalence, and for each k, suppose Sk has a pointer state |pk > with an
associated eigenvalue αk such that O|pk >= αk |pk >. Then
OΨ =
∑
λkα
k |pk > . (2)
Now suppose there is a |p0 >∈ {|pk >} such that ∀k, |α0−αk| ≤ δ and < p0|pk >≥ (1− δ),
i.e. the αk|pk > are indistinguishable up to a criterion δ. In this case,
OΨ ∼ O|S 0 > (3)
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up to the uncertainty δ, i.e. an observer O “given” |p0 > with uncertainty δ by O considered
as an oracle cannot determine whether O has acted on a single system S0 or on an entangled
family of systems
∑
λk|S
k >.
The above notion of a superposition of systems is clearly just the system-side dual of the
idea that observables may be represented as POVMs; here the Ok = |S k >< S k |O are
the POVM components. Theorem 1 states, in this notation, that an observer employing an
observable O to characterize a system S cannot determine by observation which component
Ok generated the pointer state |pj > of S “given” by the j
th instance of the action of O.
The notational change illustrated in Eq. 1 suggests a non-standard interpretation of deco-
herence. Decoherence is standardly thought of as dissipating quantum coherence into the
environment [1, 2, 4]. The question is, the environment of what? If an observer O stipulates
a system S and hence a system - environment boundary, decoherence acts as an oracle to
“give” O a pointer state |p > for S. But like all gifts from oracles, this one has a cost.
The cost is that O cannot distinguish S from a superposition of all possible systems with
pointer states indistinguishable, at O’s available resolution, from |p >. The boundary of
S has lost the precision of stipulation, and taken on the quantum fuzziness of observation.
Thus even from O’s perspective, decoherence has not destroyed quantum coherence, nor
has it moved it into some distant “environment”; it has just transferred quantum coherence
from S’s state to S’s boundary. The assumption of oracular completeness for decoherence
is, effectively, the assumption that |p > specifies S’s boundary as fixed, not fuzzy. But if
decoherence merely moves coherence from states to boundaries, this would imply that S’s
state had no coherence to begin with, i.e. that S was not a quantum system at all, but
rather was classical.
4 Oracular completeness implies classicality
Although Theorem 1 shows that oracular completeness cannot be experimentally demon-
strated by O, it may be supposed that it is harmless as an assumption. As suggested by
the reasoning above, this is not the case.
Theorem 2 : If a universe U includes a complete oracle R for at least two non-commuting
observables, U is classical. Proof : Assume a pointer state |p > for an observable O acting
on a system S is given in a Schmidt basis {ui} for U as |p >=
∑n
k=1 αkuk. The PDE requires
that for any such system S, there are an arbitrary number of alternative systems Sk such
that |Sk >= |S > |ψk > and < ψk|S >= 0. For any such Sk, and for any uncertainty
criterion δ, there is a pointer state |pk > of Sk such that |pk >= (1 − ǫ)2|p > + ǫum for
some m ≥ n and ǫ ≤ δ. To guarantee that |p > is distinguishable from |pk > when given
by R, it can only be the case that the amplitude ǫ = 0. But if the uncertainites of physical
state specifications generated by non-commuting observables are identically zero, or even
guaranteed to be less than any required δ, U can only be classical. 
The assumption of oracular completeness is, however, even stronger than an assumption
of classicality. The formalism of classical physics is consistent with and in fact relies on
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the PDE, as evidenced in practice by the ability to consider and label arbitrary volumes of
a classical fluid or regions of a classical phase space. Moreover, nothing in the formalism
of classical physics requires oracular completeness. Classical physics is consistent with
arbitrary ambiguities in the relationship between “given” states of pointers and actual
states of the world, as generations of experimentalists have experienced to their chagrin.
Oracular completeness is an extra-theoretical, non-empirical assumption even in classical
physics. This is not surprising: oracular completeness is, at bottom, an assumption about
the knowledge that observers obtain from the oracle of “given” observations. Theorem 2
states that certainty about all physical states can only be obtained in a classical world. But
a classical world hardly implies certainty.
5 Oracular completeness in the measurement problem
We now turn to the role that implicit assumptions of oracular completeness have played, and
continue to play, in the project of interpreting quantum mechanics. Consider Schro¨dinger’s
unfortunate cat. Two observations are made, one when the cat is put into the box, and
one when the box is subsequently opened. The cat is in a pointer state, either |dead > or
|alive >, during each observation. While the box is closed, the cat is assumed on the basis
of a theoretical calculation to exist in a superposition of |dead > and |alive >. Schro¨dinger’s
cat, like everything else, is a quantum system; it is the oracle of decoherence that resolves
it into one of its two pointer states whenever the box is open.
This account of the gedankenexperiment with Schro¨dinger’s cat assumes oracular complete-
ness. One and the same cat goes into the box, remains in the box when the cover is closed,
and is observed, in one or the other of its pointer states, when the box is re-opened. The
fixed identity of the cat, not just its state, is taken to be given by observation. What justi-
fies this assumption? It is not required by the formalism of quantum mechanics. It is not
proved by observation; Theorem 1 forbids such proof given pointer states, and no observa-
tions are attempted while the box is closed. The assumption that one and the same cat
is present throughout the experiment is based on “common sense” - it is extra-theoretical
and non-empirical. It is also, as Theorem 2 shows, flatly inconsistent with the assumption
that Schro¨dinger’s cat is a quantum system.
An implicit assumption of oracular completeness when describing measurement is not spe-
cific to Schro¨dinger’s cat. Writing down a von Neumann chain:
(
∑
i
λi|si >)|A
ready > |Einit > |O
ready > →
∑
i
λi|si > |ai > |ei > |oi >
→ |sn > |an > |en > |on > (4)
explicitly assumes that the system of interest S =
∑
i λi|si >, the apparatus A, observer
O and environment E, once stipulated, remain as stipulated throughout the measurement
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process. This assumption merely reflects adherence to the PDE. However, the usual inter-
pretation of the von Neumann chain also assumes both that the macroscopic ready states
|Aready > and |Oready > and the final pointer states |an > and |on > are “given” by the ora-
cle of decoherence, and that these “given” pointer states refer uniquely to the stipulated A
and O. The second of these assumptions requires the oracle of decoherence to be complete.
It therefore, by Theorem 2, requires the universe to be classical, contradicting the claim
that the von Neumann chain is describing a quantum measurement. Any interpretation of
quantum measurement that assumes that the pointer states |Aready > and |Oready > and
|an > and |on > are both given by observation and refer uniquely to the stipulated A and O
implicitly makes such an assumption of oracular completeness, and hence describes a mea-
surement process that could only occur in a classical universe. Standard interpretations
of quantum measurement make this assumption (e.g. [4]); the transactional interpretation
of Cramer [9], in which pointer states are not given by oracle, appears to avoid it. Any
interpretation of quantum measurement that takes pointer states as “given” by an oracle
and regards macroscopic objects such as apparatus and observers as having fixed identities
assumes oracular completeness, and is therefore logically inconsistent.
If the assumption of oracular completeness is dropped, Eq. 4 becomes a straightforward
statement of the action of decoherence. The “given” macroscopic pointer states |Aready >
and |Oready > at the initial observation time ti, and |an > and |on > at the final observation
time tf , imply the existence of decohered systems A|ti and O|ti at ti and A|tf and O|tf
at tf respectively, but no extra-theoretical assumption that these apparent systems are
identical to each other or to the stipulated A and O is made. Indeed as indicated by
Eq. 1, the most appropriate view of these observed systems is that they are themselves
quantum superpositions. The only unique and well-defined individual entity taken to exist
throughout the measurement process is the joint wave function |S > |A > |E > |O >, which
is viewed as labeled in the way indicated by Eq. 4 strictly for convenience. The Hamiltonian
HU is taken to be unitary; hence there is nothing that can be said to “collapse” or “branch.”
In this representation, linearity is never violated, the measurement problem in its usual
form does not arise, and the absence of experimental evidence of wave-function collapse
[10] becomes positive experimental evidence supporting decompositional equivalence.
Zurek has pointed out that the measurement problem can only be formulated if a decom-
position into systems is assumed [1, 2]. As the above discussion shows, decomposition into
systems is necessary, but not sufficient, to state the measurement problem in its traditional
form. The measurement problem arises only if decomposition into systems is accompanied
by an assumption of oracular completeness on the part of decoherence, or on the part of
whatever oracle “gives” pointer states to observers. Only if that oracle observationally
defines unique, continuously-existing entities is there an entity to collapse or branch. How-
ever, if decoherence or any other oracle defines unique, continuously-existing entities, the
universe is classical and the notions of collapse or branching are otiose.
Interpreting measurement without an assumption of oracular completeness clearly leaves a
significant question unanswered: the question of what an observer can learn about a system
S by making a measurement. This is a question about the observer’s state, which to avoid
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an assumption of oracular completeness can only be considered as a pointer state |ok > at
a particular observation time tk. All information must be physically encoded [11], so |ok >
must be regarded as encoding whatever information O “has” at tk. At ti when the mea-
surement begins, |oi > must encode, among other things, the decomposition {S,A,E,O},
specifications of the pointer states {|a1 > ...|aN >} observable at the resolution available to
O, a mapping from these available pointer states to computed states {|s1 > ...|sM >} of the
stipulated S, and the fact that |Aready > is currently observed. At tf when the measurement
ends, |of > must encode the above information, with the exception that a different pointer
state |an > is now indicated as currently observed. The transition from |oi > to |of > is
implemented by HU , and may be investigated by examining the action of the stipulated
projection |O >< O|HU on stipulated model observer states |O
ready >. However, the local
observer Hamiltonian |O >< O|HU cannot be regarded as empirically specifiable, even in
principle. To do so would introduce an assumption of oracular completeness.
The question raised by Zurek in the final paragraph of his celebrated “Rough Guide”
to decoherence [1], that of “how to define (systems) given, say, the overall Hamiltonian”
can now be partially answered. As Schmelzer [12] has pointed out, it is not possible to
uniquely define systems that “exist” at any time t given only knowledge of the universal
Hamiltonian HU . However, introducing additional observables as “fundamental” does not
solve this problem; decompositional equivalence guarantees that any additional observable,
if regarded as an oracle, will display the same ambiguities as the Hamiltonian. Any addition
to Hamiltonian dynamics that yields unique “existing” systems from observations assumes
oracular completeness, and hence classicality. Systems can be arbitrarily stipulated by
observers, but the dynamics of a universe compliant with decompositional equivalence,
and hence allowing the definition of quantum mechanical operators, does not respect such
stipulations: stipulated systems do not “exist.” Stipulations of systems by observers do,
however, represent information, and that information must be physically encoded by the
states of the stipulating observers. What systems are under observation or discussion at a
given time by a given observer is, therefore, a physical fact that can be discovered from,
and must be regarded as produced by, HU .
6 Oracular completeness and the “emergence of the
classical”
The decoherence program replaced the traditional notion that the classical should be a limit
case of the quantum (e.g. as ~→ 0) with the somewhat more subtle notion that, under the
proper observational circumstances, the classical would “emerge” from the quantum [1, 2, 4].
The program of quantum Darwinism has demonstrated that multiple observers can, without
prior knowledge of a system S, reliably expect to be able to obtain indistinguishable pointer
states |p > representing S from distinct, disjoint fragments of the environment, even under
non-optimal observational conditions [2, 3, 13]. The intuitive classical world is not, however,
a world of pointer states; it is a world of “robust” objects. As we have seen, the only way
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to obtain this “robustness” from quantum mechanics is to assume it: to assume that S has
a fixed boundary that the oracle of decoherence faithfully reports. But this assumption
of oracular completeness defeats everything; it is so strong that it is unwarranted even in
classical physics.
The most straightforward inference from this state of affairs is that “robust” intuitive
classicality does not, after all, “emerge” from quantum mechanics. It is, rather, imposed on
quantum mechanics from the outside in the form of an assumption of oracular completeness.
It is reasonable to ask, therefore, where this imposed assumption comes from. In human
observers, the assumption of oracular completeness appears to derive from the assumption
of object permanence, an assumption that develops early in infancy and appears to be hard-
wired into the interface between human perceptual and cognitive systems [14, 15]. Object
permanence underlies human “autonoetic” consciousness, which includes awareness both of
episodic memories and of the continuous existence of the self as holder of those memories
[16, 17]. Experiments with a variety of non-human species suggest that such autonoetic
consciousness is, on Earth, human-specific [16, 18]. Thus a hard-wired result of biological
Darwinism, one expressed, as far as we can tell, only in ourselves, must be added to the
pointer states produced by quantum Darwinism to get the “robustness” of the classical
world.
7 Conclusion
The results obtained here depend on four assumptions: 1) a universe U compliant with the
Principle of Decompositional Equivalence, 2) a Hamiltonian HU that is everywhere well
defined, 3) a finite minimum observation time ∆t, and 4) a finite maximum information-
transmission speed c. Under these conditions, observers can stipulate the boundaries of
systems of interest, but cannot determine such boundaries by observation. Any extra-
theoretical assumption that observers can uniquely specify boundaries of systems by obser-
vation is stronger than an assumption of classicality. These results show that what requires
interpretation in quantum mechanics is not the measurement process or the production of
pointer states, but rather the representation by observers of “given” observations as con-
tributing to “knowledge” about systems. Such representation is a physical process resulting
in a physical encoding by components of the observer state. This encoding process is not
presently well characterized; however, the understanding of the human implementation of
this process by cognitive neuroscience is advancing with impressive speed.
The measurement problem as traditionally formulated is an artifact of an extra-theoretical
and non-empirical assumption of oracular completeness that is inconsistent with quan-
tum mechanics. If this assumption is abandoned, both the measurement problem and the
requirement that physics somehow produce the “robustness” of classical objects simply
dissolve. It is ironic, given the long history of appeals to “consciousness” to resolve the
measurement problem [19, 20, 21, 22, 23, 24, 25], that consciousness, and specifically hard-
wired human autonoetic consciousness, appears to be the source of our human fiction of
10
“robustness”, and hence of our interpretational difficulties regarding measurement.
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